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CITIZENSHIP IN TIMES OF TERROR: CITIZENSHIP DEPRIVATION 
IN THE UK*  
Sandra Mantu 
 
Abstract 
Legally, citizenship may be labelled as a secure status, if not the most secure status a person can enjoy. 
This is well illustrated when contrasting citizenship with other types of legal statuses that are essentially 
related to or based on migration: foreigner, refugee, irregular migrant etc. This paper interrogates the 
received wisdom about citizenship as a secure and stable legal status by analysing the repeated 
changes operated by the UK regarding the legal rules on loss of citizenship. Since the beginning of the 
21st century, the UK rules on citizenship deprivation have been amended several times with the aim of 
getting rid of citizens who engage in activities deemed undesirable by the executive. The latest change 
to the law was adopted in 2014 and allows for loss of citizenship leading to statelessness where the 
person concerned has acquired UK citizenship by naturalisation. Up to now, based on case law and 
public information available about the cases in which the UK executive has issued citizenship depriva-
tion orders, these activities relate to terrorism and are part of a discourse about security. To this end, 
the attempt to get rid of dangerous citizens can be read as a security project aimed at creating safe 
and loyal citizens. However, the security aspect of citizenship deprivation is also coupled with a dis-
course that presents citizenship as a privilege to be bestowed by the executive, and not as a legal 
status. Although not a new trope in governmental discourses about membership and identity, presenting 
citizenship as a privilege raises some fundamental questions about the relationship between the state 
and the citizen and the manner in which citizens should be treated when they no longer conform to 
certain ideals about membership. 
 
Keywords 
citizenship, loss of citizenship, terrorism, migration, UK Parliament, Secretary of State for the Home 
Department  
 
1 Introduction 
This paper examines the legal practice of citizenship deprivation in the UK and 
its implications for the notion of citizenship more generally. Citizenship depriva-
tion is a type of loss of citizenship and refers to the power of the executive to 
take away or strip citizenship against the wishes of the person concerned. 
Generally speaking, citizenship deprivation can occur on grounds of fraud in 
relation to the acquisition of citizenship or due to behaviours deemed unac-
ceptable by the state such as, involvement in terrorism or commission of certain 
(criminal) acts. Despite the existence of a vast literature concerning citizenship, 
loss of citizenship remains a largely unexplored topic. This can be explained 
by the fact that for several decades the most important issue in respect of na-
tionality has been the integration of large numbers of migrants within European 
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states. Naturalisation policy and politics1 coupled with the issue of dual natio-
nality2 have dominated the agenda, leading to various attempts to compare 
and classify the nationality legislations of European states, especially in rela-
tion to their liberal character or lack thereof. Focusing primarily on naturalisa-
tion policies, some authors have identified a liberal trend in the nationality pol-
icies of most European states.3 
However, focusing only on naturalisation and dual nationality policies fails to 
offer a complete picture of the overall nationality legislation and policy of a 
particular state.4 The lack of interest in citizenship deprivation has been ex-
plained as a downside of the liberal trend identified in nationality politics or as 
relating to the small number of persons denaturalised in the post WWII era.5 
Another possible explanation may relate to the fact that the restrictive mood 
that has affected migration policy after 2000, and even more so in the after-
math of the ‘war on terror’ combined with the alleged failure of multicultural-
ism6 have spilled over into the field of nationality acquisition leading to more 
restrictive policies and more cumbersome procedures to be followed entailing, 
for example, citizenship and integration courses before becoming a citizen.7 
The magnitude of the changes brought in this area of nationality attribution 
seems to have overshadowed those dealing with loss of citizenship. Neverthe-
less, both sides of nationality attribution are part of a symbolic field of state 
power that dictates the composition of the citizenry, therefore affecting under-
lying ideals of identity and membership. The resurrection of the importance 
                                         
1 T.A. Aleinikoff and D. Klusmeyer (eds) (2000) From Migrants to Citizens: Membership in a Changing World, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace; T.A. Aleinikoff and D. Klusmeyer (eds) (2001) Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices, Washington DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; R. Hansen and P. Weil (eds) (2001) Towards a European Nationality: Citizenship, Immigration 
and Nationality Law in the EU, New York: Palgrave; T.A. Aleinikoff and D. Klusmeyer (eds) (2002) Citizenship Policies for an Age of Migra-
tion, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; M.M. Howard (2006) Comparative citizenship: an agenda for cross-
national research, Perspectives on Politics 4:3, p. 443-455; M.M Howard (2010) The Impact of the Far Right on Citizenship Policy in Europe: 
Explaining Continuity and Change, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36:5, pp. 735-751. 
2 O. Vonk (2012) Dual Nationality in the European Union: A Study on Changing Norms in Public and Private International Law and in the Municipal 
laws of Four EU Member States, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers; R. Hansen and P. Weil (eds) (2002) Dual Nationality, Social Rights 
and Federal Citizenship in the US and Europe: The Reinvention of Citizenship, New York: Berghahn; M.M Howard (2005) Variation in dual citi-
zenship policies in the countries of the EU, International Migration Review 39:3, pp. 697-720. 
3 C. Joppke (2010) Citizenship and Immigration, Cambridge: Polity Press; M.M. Howard (2010) The Impact of the Far Right on Citizenship Policy in 
Europe: Explaining Continuity and Change, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36:5, pp. 735-751. 
4 M.M. Howard (2010) p. 737. The coordinates used by Howard to classify a particular citizenship policy as liberal or not include the usage of ius 
soli, the number of years of residence required for naturalisation and the toleration of dual nationality. The rules on loss are not taken into 
account or even mentioned. 
5 M. Gibney (2012) ‘A Very Transcendental Power’: Denaturalisation and the Liberalisation of Citizenship in the United Kingdom, Political Studies 
61:3, pp. 637-655. 
6 For a critical appraisal of multiculturalism, see W. Kymlicka (2012) Multiculturalism: Success, Failure and the Future, in: Migration Policy Institute 
(ed.) Rethinking National Identity in the Age of Migration, Berlin: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung. 
7 R. van Oers (2013) Deserving citizenship – Citizenship tests in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers. 
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attached to loyalty as the citizen’s main duty towards his/her state suggests 
that the rules on loss of citizenship like those dealing with naturalization, ex-
press ideals of membership and identity and that the citizenship status of cer-
tain types of citizens is contingent upon meeting these ideals. The argument this 
paper puts forward, is that the legal rules on loss of citizenship are equally 
important in affecting membership in a political community and in upholding an 
ideal model of the citizen. 
 
Looking at citizenship revocation from the perspective of liberalism as the un-
derlying political ideology of European states, Gibney has argued that dena-
turalisation highlights some profound tensions between the values held by lib-
erals and the individual’s right to citizenship somewhere.8 The liberal conception 
of citizenship is based on the idea of a social contract, which in turn presuppos-
es consent. The metaphor of contract allows the revocation of citizenship in case 
those who entered the contract voluntarily break its rules. Gibney points out 
that this particular way of legitimizing citizenship deprivation is problematic, 
especially since modern states are made up by a mixture of citizens. Some citi-
zens have entered the contract voluntarily via naturalisation and some have 
been born into the contract without necessarily expressing their consent.9 This 
suggests that only the citizenship status of those who acquired it via naturalisa-
tion is at risk when engaging in acts that violate the rules of engagement. This 
goes against the central principle of liberal citizenship that all citizens are 
equal before the law. Other explanations for the use of citizenship deprivation 
suggest that we are actually witnessing a new way of conceptualising state 
power whereby depriving individuals of their citizenship status is a form of 
penal sanction to be applied to citizens in response to perceived crimes against 
public security by act or by association.10 
 
In comparison to the legal position of foreigners, citizenship is seen as a stable 
and secure legal status that entitles its carrier to the protection of his state of 
nationality. Legally, this is expressed by principles of international law that 
require states to take back their own nationals and prevent them from expel-
ling their own nationals.11 At the same time, international law attaches impor-
tance to state sovereignty and its tenet that states have the power to set down 
rules for the acquisition and loss of their citizenship. Based on Max Weber’s 
definition of the state, modern sovereignty has been theorized as ‘encompass-
                                         
8 Gibney (2012). 
9 Ibid. 
10 Kingston (2005) p. 24. 
11 A. Kesby (2012) The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship, Humanity, and International Law, Oxford University Press, pp 16-17. 
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ing the idea of a political system where authority is based on exclusive command 
over territory and a degree of autonomy’.12 Moreover, states are described as 
free to determine who the members of the national community are. By design-
ing legal rules dealing with the acquisition and loss of citizenship, states en-
gage in a series of legal practices that shape the personal scope of national 
citizenship. Therefore, citizenship can be described as involving both inclusio-
nary and exclusionary practices that are meant to express the meaning of 
identity and belonging within a specific political community. UK’s changing le-
gal regime of citizenship deprivation illustrates well the complexity of the issue 
and its intersection with immigration and security. 
At the beginning of the 21st century, the UK launched an overhaul of its rules 
on citizenship acquisition and loss with the overall effect that acquiring citizen-
ship was made more difficult while the rules on loss of citizenship have been 
relaxed and the executive was given increasing powers in this area of law. The 
adoption of legislative acts changing the rules of nationality attribution was 
coupled with vivid debates regarding the meaning of citizenship taking place 
within UK political and public spaces. The power of the Secretary of State for 
the Home Department to deprive British citizens of their status has taken centre 
stage among the statutory grounds of loss of citizenship, as the deprivation 
provisions have been amended in 2002, 2006 and 2014. 
2. Modern Nationality law and citizenship deprivation 
Throughout the 20th century, British nationality legislation underwent significant 
changes that mirror the trajectory of the British state itself. The result is a com-
plex area of law comprising a variety of statutes and citizenships, all with dif-
ferent rights attached to them.13 The rules on deprivation were introduced at 
the beginning of the 20th century in a context of rising immigration when fears 
that the welfare state pioneered in the UK might attract unsuitable citizens. The 
1914 Nationality Act was the first attempt to introduce a standardized natura-
lisation procedure across the Empire and a common nationality status based 
upon allegiance to the imperial Crown (the so-called Common Code). The 1914 
Act introduced provisions dealing with deprivation of citizenship that empo-
wered the Secretary of State to revoke a naturalisation certificate obtained by 
fraud, false representation or concealment of material circumstances.14 The is-
                                         
12 Levy and Sznaider (2006) p. 670. 
13 A. Dummett (2006) United Kingdom, in R. Bauböck, E. Ersbøll, K. Groenendijk and H. Waldrauch (eds) Acquisition and Loss of Nationality (vol 2: 
Country Analyses), Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp.551-585. There are 6 nationality statuses, 3 of which are labelled a form 
of citizenship. These statuses are: British citizenship, British Overseas Territories citizenship (former British Dependent Territories Citizenship), 
British Overseas citizenship, British subjects, British protected persons and British nationals. 
14 Section 7(1) of the 1914 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act. 
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sue was revived in the context of the First World War, and in1918, extended 
powers of deprivation were further introduced targeting naturalised Britons of 
German origin.15 Moreover, the Secretary of State gained the power to revoke 
certificates in cases of treason or disloyalty. Other grounds of loss included 
residence abroad for longer than 7 years and being sentenced to prison for 
longer than 1 year within 5 years after naturalisation. According to Gibney 
most cases of deprivation were due to residence outside of the Kingdom and 
not because of fraud or treason.16 The loyalty of naturalised citizens of enemy 
origin was questioned again during WWII, but after the end of the war the 
British government focused primarily on limiting the immigration of former co-
lonial subjects to mainland UK.17 Although nationality legislation was amended 
several times after WWII in order to reflect the end of the UK as a colonial 
power and to restrict immigration, the rules on citizenship deprivation remained 
pretty much the same. Changes were operated in 1964 in view of UK’s ratifi-
cation of the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness: the possi-
bility to be stripped of citizenship on grounds of residence in foreign countries 
was removed from the law; and in order to meet UK’s obligations in the field 
of statelessness, citizenship deprivation in case of criminal conviction was al-
lowed only in situations where it would not lead to statelessness.18 
 
The 1981 British Nationality Act, which is the last major revision of the national-
ity law did not bring changes to the rules on loss, which suggests that the issue 
did not command much interest. Registered or naturalised citizens were liable 
to lose their status if (1) citizenship had been obtained by fraud, misrepresen-
tation or concealment of a material fact; (2) were disloyal to the Queen; (3) 
had assisted the enemy in time of war or,(4) in the past five years after natura-
lisation, had been sentenced to at least twelve months imprisonment in any 
country. Fransman mentions 12 deprivations under BNA 1948 (applicable until 
the entry into force of BNA 1981) - 5 for spying or disloyalty, 5 on criminal 
grounds and 2 for fraud or misrepresentation. A further 18 cases took place in 
the dependent territories.19 Dummett mentions that about a dozen people have 
ever been deprived.20 In 2002, the UK executive confirmed that the power had 
                                         
15 Women and children would also lose their nationality in case the husband’s nationality had been revoked. For more details, see L. Fransman 
(1989) British Nationality Law, London: Fourmat Publishing, p. 51. 
16 M. Gibney (2011) Should citizenship be conditional? Denationalisation and liberal principles, Refugee Studies Centre WP 75. 
17 A. Dummett (1986) Towards a Just Immigration Policy, Cobden Trust, p. 144. 
18 British Nationality (no. 2) Act 1964, entered into force on 16 September 1964 
19 Fransman (1989) pp. 194-195. 
20 Dummett (2006) p. 571. 
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been used rarely – at that moment, the last case of deprivation had taken 
place in 1973.21 
 
The 1981 British Nationality Act (BNA) remains the statutory legal basis for 
acquisition and loss of UK citizenship, although the act itself was amended sev-
eral times since it came into force.22 The citizenship regime uses a mix of ius 
sanguinis and ius soli for acquisition, while also providing for naturalisation and 
registration as further modes of citizenship acquisition. British citizenship can be 
lost on grounds of renunciation (section 12 BNA), where the British citizen makes 
a declaration of renunciation of British citizenship that has to be registered by 
the Secretary of State. The aim is to prevent statelessness resulting from loss of 
British citizenship. To this extent, the Secretary of State must be satisfied that 
the person concerned either has a second nationality or will acquire one. Sec-
tion 13 of BNA 1981 allows for resumption of British citizenship in case of per-
sons who renounced British citizenship. Section 40 of the Act deals with depriva-
tion of citizenship, which under the current regime is allowed in two main situa-
tions. Firstly, the Secretary of State may deprive in cases of fraud, false repre-
sentation or concealment of a material fact. Secondly, the Secretary of State 
may deprive a person of a citizenship status which results from his registration 
or naturalisation if he is satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public 
good. Statelessness may occur as a result of citizenship deprivation in cases of 
fraud and since 2014 where naturalised citizens are concerned. 
3. In search of ideal citizens – Britishness redefined 
At the beginning of the 21st century the UK government launched an overhaul 
of the applicable rules of citizenship deprivation as part of a wider process of 
redesigning nationality laws with a view to restrict immigration and respond to 
concerns about national security. The need to rediscover the meaning of British-
ness and citizenship has fuelled these changes as well as the idea that British 
citizenship is a status that needs to be earned, by both naturalised citizens and 
those who acquired their status at birth, provided that they hold a second na-
tionality as well. As a result, between 2002 and 2015, there have been 3 ma-
jor changes to the citizenship deprivation provisions on grounds other than 
fraud and one change concerning appeal rights which is relevant for under-
standing the relationship between citizenship deprivation and expulsion. 
 
                                         
21 Home Office (2002) Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain, London etc.: TSO, p. 35, para. 2.22. 
22 C. Sawyer and H. Wray (2012) Country Report: United Kingdom, EUDO Citizenship Observatory. 
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While multiculturalism, integration and the meaning of Britishness were increa-
singly scrutinised in public and political spheres, citizenship became a meta-
issue.23 The incidence of race riots in northern England in May 2001 gave a 
new impetus to this debate, which resulted in several reports commissioned un-
der the Labour governments (1997-2010). The various proposals put forward 
by these reports are interpreted as highlighting Labour’s contractual approach 
to citizenship and the idea that citizenship must be earned.24 The British gov-
ernment became increasingly preoccupied with integration and the discovery 
of common held values that would define Britishness. After the Conservative 
party came to power in 2010, the restriction of immigration and asylum have 
remained a major preoccupation for the executive, while the number of persons 
deprived of citizenship has increased.25 At the same time, the British executive, 
irrespective of its political affiliation, has increasingly labelled UK citizenship a 
privilege that can be withdrawn from those unworthy of it. 
 
Initially, governmental discourse presented the need to redesign the rules of 
nationality attribution as directly relating to questions of migration and mem-
bership. The 2002 White Paper ‘Secure Borders, Safe Haven’ set out the key 
objectives for the further development of citizenship and nationality policy and 
emphasised that 
 
‘the first challenge migration poses is to our concepts of national identity and citi-
zenship and therefore, in order to ensure social integration and cohesion in the 
UK, there is a need to develop a stronger understanding of what citizenship really 
means.’26 
 
With migration, citizenship and nationality thus bundled together the rethinking 
of citizenship along the lines of immigration was firmly grounded in government 
discourse. Lord’s Goldsmith report on citizenship in the UK developed this vision 
of citizenship further while acknowledging the need to make fundamental 
changes to the design of citizenship laws.27 
                                         
23 D. Kiwan (2008) A Journey to Citizenship in the United Kingdom, International Journal on Multicultural Societies 10:1, pp. 60-75; H. Majid 
(2008) Protecting the Right to Have Rights: The Case of Section 56 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, Immigration, Asy-
lum and Nationality Law 22: 1, pp. 27-44. 
24 Everson (2003). 
25 During a Q&A session in 2013, a government representative revealed the following numbers: 2006 – one case, the person was outside of the 
UK; 2007 – one case; 2008 – none; 2009 – two cases, one person was outside of the UK; 2010 – five cases, all persons were outside of 
the UK; 2011 and 2012 – six cases and 2013 – three cases. House of Commons Debate 3 June 2013, c892-3W. 
26 Home Office (2002) Secure Borders, Safe Haven, pp. 9-10. 
27 Lord Goldsmith, Citizenship: Our Common Bond, http://www.justice.gov.uk/reviews/docs/citizenship-report- full.pdf. These changes were meant 
to be operated via the 2009 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Bill that received royal assent but was not put into practice by the Con-
servative government. 
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The report also recommended the reform of the law of treason in order to 
make the duty of allegiance relevant to modern conditions.28 The resuscitation 
of allegiance is best understood in the context of what the report calls the en-
hancement of ‘our national narrative’,29 a choice of words that cannot escape 
notice. Although migration and its impact for notions of identity and Britishness 
were the focus points of this debate, UK’s attempt to define its concept of citi-
zenship is much more complex. To a certain extent it was fuelled by UK’s acces-
sion to the European Community30 and internal processes such as devolution and 
its implications for the fragmentation of citizenship and the legitimacy of politi-
cal representation.31 Nevertheless, these aspects were not clearly contoured in 
the discussions about the need to revise the rules on nationality attribution and 
make them relevant for 21st century Britain. 
 
In the aftermath of 9/11 and UK’s support for the USA in the ‘war on terror’, 
the focus shifted and it became clearer that the attempt to define Britishness 
was also part of an official discourse that tried to redefine citizenship in the 
broader context of immigration management and the fight against terrorism. 
While the connection between nationality and immigration has always been 
there (one could argue that it is the main constant in UK nationality legislation 
during the 20th century), the connection with counter-terrorism was new. This is 
an interesting development because terrorism as such was not a new phenome-
non for the UK government (Irish terrorism has always been a particularly 
problematic issue). Moreover by 2000, the UK government had already em-
barked upon the redrawing of its terrorist legislation. The Terrorism Act 2000 
(came into force on 19 February 2001) replaced previous, ‘temporary’ anti-
terrorist legislation and addressed for the first time the issue of domestic acts 
of terrorism.32 It also set the trend of the future legislation on terrorism that 
generally aims at preventing terrorism-related activities ‘irrespective of natio-
nality or terrorist cause’33 and the establishment of extra-territorial jurisdiction. 
‘Home-grown terrorists” and radicalised citizens travelling to join terrorist 
groups in the Far East remain a challenge for the UK executive, which it has 
                                         
28 Id., p. 7. 
29 It is argued that, ‘further consideration should be given to a narrative, non-legalistic statement of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship; 
and a national day –introduced to coincide with the Olympics and Diamond Jubilee – which would provide an annual focus for our national 
narrative.’ Lord Goldsmith, p. 7. 
30 F. DellÓlio (2002) The Redefinition of the Concept of Nationality in the UK: Between Historical Responsibility and Normative Challenges, Politics 
22:1, pp. 9-16. 
31 C. Jeffery and D. Wincott (2006) Devolution in the United Kingdom: Statehood and Citizenship in Transition, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 
36:1, pp. 3-18. 
32 M. Peck (2006) The Terrorism Bill 2005-2006, Research Paper 06/66, p. 7, http://www.parliament.uk. 
33 Id., p. 8. 
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tried to deal, with (among others) by expanding the power to deprive of citi-
zenship. Citizenship, immigration and security in the form of terrorism are intrin-
sically linked and in the process of making them inseparable, the idea that citi-
zenship is a privilege not a legal status became salient. 
4. The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 – making 
citizenship matter 
The Government’s proposals regarding the review of nationality and citizenship 
legislation, announced in its 2002 White Paper, have been implemented by the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which despite its name, deals 
largely with immigration and asylum.34 
The 2002 White Paper emphasised the need to make the entire process of 
naturalisation more visible, including by upgrading the deprivation of citizen-
ship procedures.35 For the first time in the history of modern nationality legisla-
tion in the UK, the 2002 Act expanded the powers of the Secretary of State to 
deprive of citizenship British citizens by birth or descent. Section 40(2) allowed 
the Secretary of State to deprive by order “a person of a citizenship status if 
the Secretary of State is satisfied that the person has done anything seriously pre-
judicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom or a British Overseas territo-
ry.’ However, because section 40(4) restricted the power of the Secretary of 
State only to cases where the person would not become stateless because of 
loss of citizenship, the provision applied only in respect of dual nationals. Sec-
tion 40(3) dealt with the power of the Secretary of State to deprive by order 
a registered or naturalised citizen if he/she is satisfied that the registration or 
naturalisation was obtained by means of fraud, false representation or con-
cealment of a material fact. Deprivation was allowed in this case regardless of 
the fact that the person could become stateless.36 
 
As a positive development, the 2002 Act introduced procedural safeguards 
against the decision to deprive.37 Most commentators have welcomed them, 
since under the BNA 1981 the Secretary of State enjoyed discretion as to deci-
                                         
34 The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 received royal assent on 7 November 2002. Several parts of the Act have entered into 
force later. 
35 The 2002 White Paper particularly criticized the automatic character of the naturalisation process and argued that it did not mark the impor-
tance of this step in a person’s life. As such, the 2002 Act brought important changes to the naturalisation procedure; it required applicants 
to have knowledge of language and society, expanded the language test to spouses applying for naturalisation, introduced citizenship ce-
remonies, as well as, an oath and pledge. 
36 There is no change in respect of this case of deprivation; the previous legislation contained the same provision. Despite that fact that it may lead 
to statelessness, this approach is in line with the international standards on nationality set by both the 1961 UN Convention and the Council 
of Europe in the ECN. 
37 Section 40A 
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sions relating to nationality; such decisions were not subject to appeal or review 
in any court. The amendments were introduced in order to make the UK legisla-
tion compatible with the requirements of the European Convention on Nationali-
ty (ECN), which at that time, the UK government claimed it intended to ratify. 
However, the law also provided for exceptions: when the Secretary of State 
certifies that the decision to deprive is based, wholly or partially, in reliance to 
information that he believes should not be made public in the interests of na-
tional security or of the relationship between the United Kingdom and another 
country or otherwise, in the public interest,38 the appeal is to be heard by the 
Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC). Initially, SIAC was set up to 
hear cases of deportation in which the decision is based on sensitive information 
that cannot be reviewed by the ordinary courts, nor fully disclosed to the par-
ties.39 Furthermore, under the 2002 provisions a deprivation order could not be 
made while any appeal was pending or while the possibility of launching an 
appeal within the time limit remained.40 In 2004, this aspect of the law was 
changed to allow a citizenship deprivation order to have immediate legal ef-
fect. The consequence is that the person against whom the order is made, al-
though retains the right to appeal the decision, becomes a foreigner and is 
therefore subjected to immigration control. If outside of the UK when deprived, 
an exclusion from the UK order can be made against him preventing him from 
entering the UK, leading to an out of country appeal procedure.41 
 
Bearing in mind that, at that particular moment, the last case of citizenship de-
privation had taken place in 1973, the real question is why the government felt 
the need to introduce new powers.42 The Government’s response relies on two 
arguments. From the 2002 White Paper ‘Secure Borders, Safe Haven’, it can be 
                                         
38 Section 40A (2). There is no definition of these grounds in the Act. 
39 SIAC Act 1997. The introduction of SIAC relates to the criticism voiced by the ECtHR regarding the lack of appeal against the Home Secretary’s 
decision to deport on national security grounds or to exclude from the United Kingdom on grounds that this was conducive to the public 
good. Under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, the Commission has jurisdiction to hear appeals against decisions of the Se-
cretary of State to certify suspected terrorists. The intelligence, upon which the decision was reached, is not disclosed to the appellant but he 
is appointed a Special Advocate who has partial access to the said material. See, P. Catz (2003) United Kingdom: Withdrawing from Inter-
national Human Rights Standards, in E. Brouwer, P. Catz, E. Guild (eds), Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism: A changing Dynamic in European 
Law, Recht & Samenleving 19, Nijmegen: GNI, pp. 86-87; D. Bonner and R. Cholewinski (2007) The Response of the United Kingdom’s Le-
gal and Constitutional Orders to the 1991 Gulf War and the Post -9/11 ‘War’ on Terrorism, in E. Guild and A. Baldaccini (eds), Terrorism 
and the Foreigner, Brill, pp. 123-175. 
40 Section 40A(6). The Home Secretary first had to make a notice of her decision to deprive but the actual order was made after the time limit for 
launching the appeal had passed or where the notice was appealed, after the court took it decision. 
41 Schedule 4 to the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004; SSHD (respondent) v. B2 (appellant), Case ID: UKSC 
2013/0150 [accessed 19 January 2015]; G1 v. SSHD [2010] EWCA Civ 867; L1 v. SSHD, SC/100/2010, date of judgment 3 December 
2010. 
42 See also, the comments of ILPA on the 2002 Bill. 
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inferred that the review of the deprivation powers was among the measures 
aimed at injecting valour in the entire naturalisation process, by stressing the 
importance of citizenship per se.43 In addition, the UK executive considered that 
the previous wording of the deprivation powers did not reflect accurately ‘the 
types of activity that might threaten our democratic institutions and way of life. 
September 11th provided a horrific illustration of the sort of threat we have in 
mind’.44 During the debates in both Houses of Parliament, the Government’s 
contention that the expansion of the power to deprive would aid in the war 
against terrorism has been scrutinized and considered unconvincing, especially 
in the light of the extensive measures introduced earlier by the Anti- terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001 to deal with persons committing terrorism related 
offences. The main concern was that, in reality, the Government was trying to 
deal with such persons by the back door and instead of prosecuting them it 
would first deprive them of citizenship and then extradite them to a different 
country, possibly without sufficient guarantees against torture or other prohi-
bited treatments under Article 3 ECHR.45 The British government clarified that 
the scope ratio materiae of the new deprivation power encompassed national 
security and other prejudicial activities that had to do with infrastructure, vital 
economic interests and the general safety of the population.46 They reassured 
that ‘the term vital interests will be interpreted as covering threats to national and 
economic security and to public safety …but not actions of a more general crimi-
nal nature’.47 Rather worryingly, the executive explained that it wished to be 
able to deprive of citizenship irrespective of the behaviour in question giving 
rise to criminal liability.48 This suggests the disjunction between committing a 
criminal act and being deprived of citizenship. Citizenship deprivation is seen 
as an alternative to the traditional avenue of imposing criminal sanctions but 
for the person concerned it leads to a lower threshold of protection than that 
                                         
43 In the 2002 White Paper ‘Secure Borders, Safe Haven’, (para. 2.22) it is argued that ‘the Government believes that a corollary of attaching 
importance to British citizenship is that the UK should use the power to deprive someone of that citizenship – for example where it has been 
acquired through some form of deception or concealment and where that individual would not have been granted citizenship had they dis-
closed information requested from them’. 
44 Select Committee on the Constitution, 6th Report, 17 June 2002, HL Paper 129, p. 6. 
45 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum bill 2002, Hansard debate 09 October 2002, vol. 639, cc 273-274. The Lords have also found it difficult 
to believe that by severing the link of allegiance via deprivation of citizenship, the person concerned would feel less inclined to engage in 
activities against the interest of the UK in the future. 
46 See HC Committee, 30.04.02 cols 60-62; HL Committee 08.07.02 col 505. 
47 HL Committee 08.07.02 col 537. 
48 ‘…we do not believe that liability to deprivation should arise only following a conviction. For example, there may be situations where the 
evidence of seriously prejudicial conduct would not be admissible in criminal proceedings. The protection of vital interests which the depriva-
tion provisions would allow would extend wider than that afforded by criminal law.’ Nationality, Immigration and Asylum bill 2002, Han-
sard debate 09 October 2002, vol 639, cc 280-281. 
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afforded to citizens in general as a result of constitutional arrangements in re-
spect of criminal liability. 
 
The Government’s claim, that the clause would in fact end discrimination in the 
removal of citizenship between citizens by birth and naturalised ones, has been 
challenged as several Lords argued that the new clause introduced a new dis-
crimination ground, between dual and mono-citizens.49 The issue is not without 
relevance since there are no statistics in the UK on the number of citizens hold-
ing a second nationality50 and the UK is perceived as a country with a relaxed 
attitude towards dual nationality. By making citizenship deprivation applicable 
only in respect of dual nationals, the issue of allegiance and loyalty towards 
the UK became relevant since dual nationality in combination with engaging in 
behaviours that are not approved by the state opens up the possibility to lose 
citizenship. 
 
5. The Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 – conducive 
to the public good 
It The 7 July 2005 London bombings occurred shortly after a new bill on immi-
gration, asylum and nationality had been introduced in the UK Parliament.51 
The bill was adopted one year later as the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality 
Act 2006. Although the changes proposed had been elaborated before the 
London bombings, the legislative process of the law’s adoption was clearly un-
der their influence. Shortly after the terrorist bombings, the then newly re-
elected prime minister Tony Blair announced in a press conference a twelve 
point plan of anti-terror measures, in which direct reference was made to citi-
zenship deprivation powers.52 Based upon the same plan, the Government 
came up with a list of unacceptable behaviours that constitute grounds for de-
portation and exclusion from the UK, as well as, extended the use of control 
orders for those who are British nationals and cannot be deported. Generally, 
the government’s response to the terrorist threat has materialized in a series of 
legislative and executive measures in which deportation and detention, not 
necessarily based on judicial scrutiny, were the main denominators. 
                                         
49 Hansard deb 09 October 2002, vol 639, cc 273, 275. 
50 Written answers Hansard, 13 Feb 2013: Column 758W. It is not clear whether upon acquiring British nationality one has to declare whether one 
has renounced his/her previous nationality. From the answers given in Parliament, it would appear that there is no statistical data on how 
many citizens are dual nationals. 
51 The Bill was introduced in the Commons on the 22 June 2005 and received royal assent on 30 March 2006. The provisions on deprivation of 
citizenship entered into force on 16 June 2006 via a commencement order. 
52 http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/aug/05/uksecurity.terrorism1. 
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One of the hallmarks of the new counter-terrorism strategy is the use of immi-
gration and nationality powers as efficient avenues for the physical removal of 
undesirable and dangerous individuals from the territory of the UK, which is 
also traceable in the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006. The Act 
builds on two published Government proposals: 
‘Controlling our borders: Making migration work for Britain’ (February 2005), 
the Home Office five-year strategy for asylum and immigration and ‘Confident 
Communities in a Secure Britain’, the Home Office Strategic Plan, 2004-2008 
published in July 2004.53 Under the 2002 Act, citizenship deprivation was poss-
ible if the person concerned had done something seriously prejudicial to vital 
national interests,. Under the 2006 Act deprivation is possible under section 
40(2) if the Secretary of State is satisfied that such deprivation is conducive to the 
public good.54 Furthermore, the Secretary of State acquired a new power, 
namely, to withdraw the right of abode in the United Kingdom from any person 
whose exclusion or removal from the country he considers conducive to the pub-
lic good, which suggests a new bifurcation between citizenship and residence.55 
Since the 2002 Act had already increased governmental power concerning 
citizenship deprivation, it was unclear why a further extension of those powers 
was necessary.56 The Government’s argument was that the previous test was 
too high and involved too many hurdles, and generally, made it too difficult to 
deprive.57 
 
‘Conducive to the public good’ is a concept borrowed from immigration law 
where it is used in the context of deportation of non-nationals. The power to 
deport non-nationals is directly related with the power of the state to regulate 
the entry and stay of aliens. In international law, it is generally asserted that no 
similar power is to be exercised over one’s own citizens as this difference in 
treatment is one of the elements that differentiate between citizens and 
aliens.58 From this perspective, it is problematic that dual British citizens are 
                                         
53 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Bill, Explanatory Notes, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200606/cmbills/013/06013x.htm. 
The Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Bill, Research paper 05/52, 30 June 2005, House of Commons, p. 9.  
54 Clause 56, Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, chapter 13. 
55 Clause 57, Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, chapter 13. The government argued that the clause was necessary because in the 
case of persons whose right of abode derives from citizenship of a Commonwealth country (other than the UK) who engage in unacceptable 
behaviours there was no mechanism of deprivation of the right of abode. See, House of Commons Standing Committee E (pt 1), col 255. 
56 ILPA Briefing, Terrorism Clauses 7, 50-54, House of Commons Report 16 November 2005 where they argue that the case for the new clause has 
not been made by the Government. 
57 Baroness Ashton of Upholland, Lords Hansard text for 14 March 2006 (60314-29), col 1190. 
58 ILPA evidence prepared for House of Commons Standing Committee, Committee sessions 27 October 2005, para. 19-20. ILPA has been 
extremely critical vis-à-vis the new test. They pointed out that in international law it is accepted that states have the right to control the ad-
mission and expulsion of aliens from their territories, but there is no such principle legitimizing the expulsion of a state’s own nationals. 
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equated with non-nationals as far as the protection against deprivation is con-
cerned.59 It also begs questions as to how tolerant British law actually is in rela-
tion to dual nationality. Because the law fails to define ‘conducive to the public 
good’, the Government’s explanation as to how it intends to use the new pow-
ers is relevant: 
 
‘This Bill is about immigration, asylum and nationality law, and the new clauses 
are about changes to that law in terms of what is happening now in our wider 
counter-terrorism initiative.’ […] ‘Following the terrorist attacks in London on 7 
July, the Home Secretary published a list of behaviours on 24 August which, he 
said, would form the basis for the use of his discretionary powers to deport and 
exclude from the United Kingdom those whose presence here was deemed not to 
be conducive to the public good. […] It is, in our view, now essential that we have 
similar powers to withhold and to remove British nationality and the right of ab-
ode in the United Kingdom where an individual is found to have engaged in such 
activity.’60 
 
The text points towards one of the main concerns expressed by most parties to 
the debate in Parliament, namely the conflation of terrorism, migration and 
nationality.61 
 
The list of unacceptable behaviours published by the Home Secretary following 
the announcement by the Prime Minister in August 2005 of a twelve-point plan 
to deal with terrorism are part of the definition of national security and possi-
bility leading to citizenship deprivation.62 The behaviours in question made their 
way into the Terrorism Act 2006 as new offences.63 According to the consulta-
tion paper published by the government, the list is indicative and it aims at 
dealing more fully and systematically with those who in effect, represent an 
indirect threat under the same categories, in particular those who foment ter-
rorism or seek to provoke others to terrorist acts. The list includes actions such as 
writing, producing, publishing or distributing material, public speaking, includ-
ing preaching, running a website, using a position of responsibility such as 
                                         
59 Commission for Racial Equality, Briefing for the House of Lords, third reading, 14 March 2006, paras 35 and 38. See also, Lords Hansard text 
for 19 Jan 2006 (60119-31). 
60 Mr. McNulty in House of Commons Standing Committee E (pt 1), col 254. 
61 The 12-point plan on CT measures http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/aug/05/uksecurity.terrorism1. See also, House of Commons 
Hansard written Answers for 06 June 2007 (pt 0027), column 619W. 
62 The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world, March 2008, www. interacti-
ve.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/documents/security/national_security_ strategy.pdf. 
63 Terrorism Act 2006 and also the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 which criminalised incitement to religious hatred. 
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teacher, community or youth leader to express views which the government con-
siders to foment terrorism or seek to provoke others to terrorist acts, justify or 
glorify terrorism, foment other serious criminal activity or seek to provoke oth-
ers to serious criminal acts, foster hatred which may lead to intra-community 
violence in the UK and advocate violence in furtherance of a particular belief.64 
The list has been criticized for its broad formulation, its overlapping of the be-
haviours targeted with criminal law offences and the use of deportation as a 
counter-terrorism measure in itself.65 
 
However, being a threat to the national security of the UK and therefore possi-
bly coming within the scope of the citizenship deprivation powers should be 
understood in a larger context since UK’s national security strategy has a much 
wider scope than terrorism. National security encompasses a vast range of is-
sues including trans-national crime, nuclear weapons, global instability, climate 
change, poverty, inequality and poor governance etc. It is argued that while no 
state is currently threatening the United Kingdom, ‘Over recent decades, our 
view of national security has broadened to include threats to individual citizens 
and to our way of life…’66 Taking into account this very broad construction of 
national security it is difficult to see how the mechanism of deportation or de-
privation of citizenship on national security grounds might apply in cases of 
threats to global stability, for example.67 The conclusion seems to be that it is 
operational only in respect of terrorism, trans-national crime and weapons of 
mass destruction, even if the threats are indirect. 
 
                                         
64 Exclusion or Deportation from the UK on non-conducive grounds: consultation document, www.homeoffice.gov.uk. G. Clayton (2012) Textbook on 
Immigration and Asylum Law, Oxford: OUP, p. 583; D. Bonner and R. Cholewinski (2007); M. Elliot (2006) United Kingdom : Detention wit-
hout trial and the ‘war on terror’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 4: 3, pp. 553-566 
65 Due to the criticism expressed, the government decided to delete from the initial list the expression of views that the government considers to be 
extreme views that are in conflict with the UK’s culture of tolerance. Most organisations have seen this ground as an attack to the right to 
freedom of expression, which no terrorist attack could possibly justify. Response to Home Office Consultation on Exclusion or Deportation 
from the UK on Non-Conducive Grounds – Article 19, London, 2005 – Index Number: Law/190805; Exclusion or Deportation from the UK 
on Non-Conducive Grounds – A JUSTICE response, August 2005, www.justice.org.uk; Amnesty International Press release, UK: New security 
measures are a serious attack on human rights, 24 August 2005,http://news.amnesty.org. 
66 The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world, March 2008, para. 1.3 and para. 1.5. 
67 Let us imagine a dual British German national who embezzles a large amount of money which leads to a severe financial crisis and the bank-
ruptcy of pension funds leaving a couple of hundreds of thousands of persons without income. Would this situation lead to loss of citizenship 
or would it remain confined to the area of criminal law? For the time being, the only clear thing is that deprivation is considered in cases of 
involvement in terrorist activities of a specific group, Al-Qaeda. 
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6. The Immigration Act 2014 – naturalised citizens as ‘unsafe’ 
citizens 
Although the number of citizenship deprivation orders has increased since 
2010, the Conservative government (in power also since 2010) decided to 
amend the rules yet again. At the end of 2013, the Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Theresa May, announced plans for a new immigration bill, 
which eventually was adopted as the Immigration Act 2014.68 In addition to the 
overhaul of the immigration system,69 the bill extended even further the power 
of the Secretary of State to make a citizenship deprivation order where the 
person acts in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK. 
Under the new provision, the Secretary of State can make such an order even 
if the person will be made stateless, provided that nationality was obtained 
through naturalisation.70 The Secretary of State must be satisfied that the de-
privation is conducive to the public good because the person has conducted him 
or herself in a manner which is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the 
UK. 
 
During the debates in the House of Commons, the proposed changes were 
questioned in relation to issues of equality of treatment between naturalised 
citizens and citizens by birth, the procedural aspects of citizenship deprivation 
and the ineffectiveness of citizenship deprivation in countering terrorism and 
fundamentalism.71 These arguments are not new as they were raised during the 
adoption of the 2002 and 2006 provisions on citizenship deprivation in more 
or less the same fashion. However, the executive’s assurance that the new ex-
tended power to deprive was necessary in relation to national security and the 
threat posed by radicalised UK citizens who were travelling to join the civil war 
in Syria convinced the House of Commons to adopt the amendment. By the time 
the proposal reached the House of Lords, there was growing public interest 
and debate about the new citizenship deprivation proposals.72 The executive’s 
                                         
68 Immigration Bill (HC Bill 110). For details see, http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2013-14/ immigration.html. Immigration Act 2014 c.22; the 
act received royal assent on 14 May 2014. 
69 According to the executive, the immigration bill aims to: (a) reform the removal and appeals system, making it easier and quicker to remove 
those with no right here; (b) end of abuse of Article 8, the right to respect for private and family life, and (c) prevent illegal immigrants ac-
cessing and abusing public services or the labour market. 
70 Section 66 of the Immigration Act 2014 has introduced subsection (4A) into section 40 British Nationality Act 1981. A. Harvey (2014) Recent 
Developments on Deprivation of Nationality on Grounds of National Security and Terrorism resulting in Statelessness, Journal of Immigrati-
on, Asylum and Nationality Law 28:4, pp.339-341. 
71 Immigration Bill 2013-2014, House of Commons Debates 30 January 2014, cols 1039-1052 and 1104. 
72 Some felt that the citizenship deprivation powers detracted much needed attention from the other sweeping changes introduced by the immigra-
tion bill, A. Aliverti (2014) The New Immigration Act 2014 and the Banality of Immigration Controls, 
http://bordercriminologies.law.ox.ac.uk/banality-of-immigration-controls/ 
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arguments concerning national security and the need for more expansive pow-
ers to deprive of citizenship did not convince the House of Lords, who rejected 
the amendment and instead proposed to defer to a parliamentary committee 
the question whether the UK executive should deprive of citizenship and make 
people stateless in the process.73 Eventually a compromise was reached by in-
troducing two safeguards. Firstly, the Secretary of State has to have reasona-
ble grounds for believing that the person is able to become a national of 
another country or territory when making the citizenship deprivation order. Se-
condly, an independent reviewer will periodically review the exercise of the 
power to deprive. The Parliament accepted this compromise position and even-
tually the law was adopted and came into force on 28 July 2014.74 The effects 
of these safeguards remain to be asserted in practice. Yet, it can be argued 
that they go only a very short way towards mitigating the effects of the new 
citizenship deprivation powers. Based on international law standards and the 
definition of statelessness, a person is either stateless or not, while UK’s rules on 
citizenship deprivation actively create new stateless persons. The review of ex-
ecutive use of citizenship deprivation powers is in itself a welcome develop-
ment. Up to now, the UK executive has been very reluctant to furnish any infor-
mation concerning the persons it has deprived of citizenship and their circums-
tances, with most details coming from journalists. On a less positive note, it is 
unclear what consequences are attached to the review process: can it lead to 
new legislation or curtailment of executive powers? 
The State Secretary confirmed that the UK executive did not intend to become 
a party to the 1997 European Convention on Nationality that does not allow 
deprivation to take place on grounds conducive to the public good if it results 
in statelessness.75 In her opinion, the new provision simply brings back the law 
to the position prior to 2002, a position that is in line with the 1961 UN Con-
vention on the Reduction of Statelessness. The UK has signed the Convention in 
1966 but made a reservation in respect of citizenship deprivation. The UK re-
tained the power that already existed in its legislation at the time of ratifica-
tion to deprive a naturalised citizen, regardless of whether or not it might leave 
him stateless, where that person had conducted himself in a manner seriously 
prejudicial to the vital interests of her Majesty. In reality, on the issue of loss of 
citizenship, the UK is going back to its law as it stood at the beginning of the 
20th century, despite all the advancements that have taken place since in inter-
national law concerning the human right to a nationality and the prevention of 
statelessness. 
                                         
73 House of Lords Report, 7 April 2014, col 1195. 
74 Immigration Act 20014 (Commencement No. 1, Transitory and Saving Provisions) Order 2014, SI2014/1820, art 3(t). 
75 House of Commons Debates, 30 January 2014, col 1041. 
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As the law stands, the test used in respect of naturalised citizens is ‘conduct that 
is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom, any of the Isl-
ands, or any British overseas territory’. When the bill was first introduced, the 
executive stated that it does not wish to be ‘overly prescriptive about what this 
phrase means (seriously prejudicial to the vital interest of the UK) but we would 
envisage it covering those involved in terrorism or espionage or those who take 
up arms against British or allied forces.’76 The exact content of the test remains 
(yet again) unspecified by legislation but in the House of Commons, the Secre-
tary of State has further explained that the actions viewed as prejudicial will 
be considered in light of the values attached to British citizenship as encapsu-
lated by the oath that naturalised citizens take when they attend citizenship 
ceremonies.77 She further stated that ‘the whole point of the measure is to be 
able to remove certain people from the United Kingdom, which currently we are 
unable to do’.78 This aim remains valid even if in certain cases removal is not 
possible because person became stateless. 
 
The Secretary of State was keen to emphasise that the power to deprive of 
citizenship equally applies to persons who are outside of the UK. She confirmed 
that since 2006, 27 persons were deprived of citizenship on conducive grounds, 
and 13 on grounds of fraud and that she made 16 orders. It needs to be hig-
hlighted that the number of persons deprived of citizenship is unclear. Accord-
ing to non-governmental sources that have been tracking developments in this 
field, in 2013 alone, the Home Secretary had taken away citizenship from 20 
persons. 
The number they quote since 2010 is 37 persons.79 In Parliament, the Secretary 
of State failed to specify, how many of the persons deprived of citizenship 
were outside of the UK when the order was made and against how many of 
them exclusion orders from the UK were equally issued. Journalists have hig-
hlighted cases where UK citizens deprived of citizenship while in the Middle 
East were subsequently killed by American drone attacks or appeared in US 
high- security prisons.80 Although the Home Office has refused to comment on 
these cases, the link between citizenship deprivation orders and their possible 
                                         
76 UK Government (2014) Immigration Bill, Fact sheet: Deprivation of citizenship (clause 60) January 2014. 
77 House of Commons Debates, 30 January 2014, col 1042. 
78 Id., col 1043. 
79 The Bureau of Investigative journalism has played an essential part in bringing these cases to the public’s attention. The Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism (2013) ‘Rise in citizenship-stripping as government cracks down on UK fighters in Syria’, 23 December 2013. 
80 C. Woods, A. Ross & O. Wright (2013) ‘British terror suspects quietly stripped of citizenship…then killed by drones’, The Independent, 28 
February 2013. 
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effects for the personal security of those deprived of citizenship is addressed in 
a document prepared by the Home Office to discuss the compatibility of the 
proposals introduced by the Immigration Act 2014 with the ECHR.81 
 
The new powers to deprive of citizenship are a reaction to the decision taken 
by the Supreme Court in the Al-Jedda case where the UK executive was pre-
vented from making a citizenship deprivation order against Mr Al-Jedda since 
that order would have left him stateless.82 The necessity of passing new legisla-
tion do deal with one specific case and, one may add, the executive’s frustra-
tion at not being able to deprive one individual of his citizenship, was hig-
hlighted by the report of the Lords Committee on the Constitution as an aspect 
that needed further clarification and debate. The new provision is also an at-
tempt to deal with UK citizens (believed to be) involved in terrorist training and 
fighting overseas, some of whom may consider returning to the UK. However, 
the new powers to deprive need to be seen within the larger context of UK’s 
response to the phenomenon of British citizens travelling to the Middle East to 
join armed conflicts there. The UK executive has made use of powers to strip 
persons of their passports as a way of preventing them to travel to certain 
countries or, if already there, to return to the UK. Its position on the issue of 
passports is that British nationals do not have an automatic right to a pass-
port.83 The Home Secretary can refuse to issue a passport as well as withdraw 
or cancel one. The intersection of citizenship deprivation powers with terrorism 
and immigration was clearly spelled out by Prime Minister Cameron in a Sep-
tember 2014 speech in Parliament. He stated 
 
‘As well as stopping people from going, we must also keep out foreign fighters 
who would pose a threat to the UK. [...] we legislated in the Immigration Act 
2014, to allow stronger powers to strip citizenship from naturalised Britons. But, 
of course, these powers do not apply to those who are solely British nationals, 
who could be rendered stateless if deprived of citizenship. [...] what we need is a 
targeted, discretionary power to allow us to exclude British nationals from the 
UK.’84 
 
                                         
81 Home Office (2014) Immigration Bill – European Convention on Human Rights: Supplementary Memorandum by the Home Office, 
http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-bill-overarching documents. 
82 Al-Jedda v. SSHD [2010] EWCA Civ 358; SSHD v. Al-Jedda [2013] UKSC 62. See also, Immigration Bill 2013-2014, House of Commons 
Debates 30 January 2014, col 1040. 
83 https://www.gov.uk/british-passport-eligibility 
84 House of Commons Debate, 1 September 2014, col 26. 
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The prospect of a discretionary power to exclude citizens from the UK poses a 
series of questions concerning UK’s international law obligations that are 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, such a proposal comes dangerously 
close to expelling own nationals, a practice that is prohibited under interna-
tional and human rights law and which is reminiscent of practices we normally 
associate with less enlightened times.  
 
7. Citizenship and (in)security 
The increasing powers of the State Secretary to deprive under the current leg-
islation even British born nationals of their nationality provided that they en-
gage in behaviour conducive to the public good suggests that certain citizens 
are increasingly perceived and treated by state officials as a threat or a risk 
that needs to be managed. The changing rules on citizenship deprivation and 
their actual implementation by the administration are explained as a downside 
of the liberalization of citizenship regimes within the last decades or as part of 
a larger securitizing trend that is linked with the emergence of terrorist threats 
after 9/11. And yet, the historical context in which citizenship deprivation 
powers were introduced suggests that the power to deprive of citizenship is 
intrinsically related to the configuration of modern nationality legislations. The 
UK has engaged in practices of citizenship deprivation during politically unsta-
ble times or during war, when the loyalty of citizens with a foreign background 
was questioned to the extent that some were stripped of their status. What is 
relevant here is the power of the state to use law to transform citizens into fo-
reigners and violently impose the limits of national identity. The policing of po-
litical and social spaces through nationality powers is therefore not a new phe-
nomenon. Historically, citizenship deprivation has been successfully mobilized to 
secure the boundaries of the nation from the perspective of state interests that 
deemed the ethnicity or race of some citizens to be a sign of their dangerous-
ness and irreconcilable difference. 
Although most authors considered citizenship deprivation to be a practice of 
the past, the UK example shows that is simply not the case. The UK changes can 
be explained as part of the executive’s securitizing agenda triggered by the 
war on terror in the post-9/11 context. This security drive has affected natio-
nality and immigration laws and generated the twin effects of making it more 
difficult to acquire nationality and easier to lose it. There are several argu-
ments that can be put forward towards reading the extension of the power to 
deprive of citizenship as a counter-terrorism measure. The UK has joined the 
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USA from the beginning in the ‘war on terror’ and has participated in the inva-
sions of Afghanistan and Iraq which suggest that national security issues were 
indeed relevant for the formulation of policy more generally. The issue of home 
grown terrorists gained even more prominence after the 2005 attacks in Lon-
don that were operated by British born Muslims. From this angle, the 2006 and 
2014 Acts could easily be inscribed within the discourse and agenda on anti-
terrorism. The first changes introduced in 2002 are more difficult to inscribe 
within a purely counter- terrorist agenda, as the proposal to amend the rules 
on citizenship deprivation was part of an ongoing discussion about the meaning 
and value of British citizenship and Britishness, more generally. According to 
Fortier, the race riots of 2001 sprung a concern for ‘white Britons’ and the 
management of difference, as multiculturalism was increasingly perceived as a 
failure.85 The British executive became increasingly preoccupied with the mean-
ing of citizenship and Britishness and how to inject valour into the notion of Brit-
ish citizenship, not least by emphasizing that it is a legal status that can be lost 
by those who engage in acts that go against the interests of the state. Tyler has 
traced the idea that British citizenship is not an entitlement back to the 1981 
British Nationality Act that was adopted during a period of ‘intense institutional 
reorganisation that was to transform Britain into a neoliberal nation- state’.86 Ty-
ler argues that the 1981 BNA was design to fail certain categories of former 
colonial subjects and delegitimize their claims to citizenship and that ‘by the 
early 1980’s citizenship had become dislocated from any redistributive ideals: 
the Marshallian constellation of welfare state, social rights and class equality was 
replaced with nationality, immigration and security’.87 According to Bosworth 
and Guild, this interlinked approach to citizenship was continued under the 
New Labour governments (1997-2007) that in an ‘often contradictory manner 
have promoted the ideal of citizenship while eroding its protections’.88 
The 2002, 2006 and 2014 Acts that have modified the rules on citizenship de-
privation have to be analysed as part of this larger process of reshaping the 
meaning of belonging and membership while at the same time immigration and 
asylum were being rephrased as security issues. 
                                         
85 A-M. Fortier (2010) Proximity by design? Affective citizenship and the management of unease, Citizenship Studies 14:1, pp. 17-30. Fortier 
discusses the development of a cohesion agenda that aimed at creating cohesive communities and preventing people from living parallel li-
ves. She notices a similar trend whereby the cohesion agenda became gradually tied in with criminal justice, immigration and security agen-
da (p. 20). 
86 I. Tyler (2010) Designed to Fail: A Biopolitics of British Citizenship, Citizenship Studies 14:1, p. 62. 
87 Ibid. 
88 M. Bosworth and M. Guild (2008) Governing Through Migration Control, British Journal of Criminology 48, p. 706. 
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In this context it is relevant that allegiance has made a comeback within the 
legal formulation of citizenship rules as the duty of loyalty is increasingly un-
derlined in state discourses on membership. Loyalty is legally phrased as an 
obligation not to engage in conducts deemed undesirable by the state. At the 
same time, loyalty occupies an important discursive space in political imagina-
ries about what it means to be a citizen. In the UK context, holding dual natio-
nality is suspect and invites questions as to one’s loyalty especially if one tra-
vels back to one’s region of origin or participates in political dissidence related 
to one’s place of origin. Thus, one can conclude that despite being allowed to 
maintain transnational ties and a transnational identity by means of preserving 
one’s nationality of origin, transnationalism remains politically dubious and may 
be interpreted as a sign of disloyalty should the need arise. 
Naturalised citizens and citizens of immigrant descent (through their dual natio-
nality) are targeted by citizenship deprivation measures leading to the ques-
tion as to when one ceases to be a foreigner. What is equally problematic is 
the attempt to challenge the legal reply to this question that is encapsulated by 
the internationally recognized principles that all citizens are equal before the 
law and that the manner in which they have acquired their citizenship is irrele-
vant.89 Yet, as Honig has argued 
‘Foreignness is a symbolic marker that the nation attaches to the people we want 
to disavow, deport or detain because we experience them as a threat. The distinc-
tion between who is part of the nation and who is an outsider is not exhausted or 
even finally defined by working papers, skin colour, ethnicity or citizenship. In-
deed, it is not an empirical line at all; it is a symbolic one, used for political rea-
son.’90 
The mobilisation of political capital in the quest to thin out the citizenship status 
of some categories of citizens who are perceived as unworthy of that quality or 
dangerous has achieved mixed results. On one hand, there is a hierarchy of 
citizens developing, as those citizens who are deprive-able seem to occupy an 
intermediate position between ‘real’ citizens and foreigners. Nyers has cap-
tured extremely well the significance of this move when he argued that 
‘...unmaking citizens through performative or political means – by insisting, for 
example, that certain citizens are unworthy of the status – is often a key condition 
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for unmaking citizenship through law’.91 On the other hand, the difficulties en-
countered by the UK executive when it actually started to deprive citizens of 
their status (especially in the Al- Jedda case) speak volumes for the fact that 
state power is not unrestricted and that state sovereignty is limited by interna-
tional obligations (the statelessness issue) and their application by (national) 
courts. Understanding why citizenship deprivation rules were changed is impor-
tant as the attempt to change the established rules in this area of law point 
towards underlying transformations in the framing of concepts such as, the na-
tion, the ideal of the citizen and the relationship between state, citizen and so-
ciety. 
7. Citizenship and (in)security 
If citizenship is a privilege (as the UK executive insists on arguing) then citizen-
ship is by all means not a secure legal status. The changes operated to loss of 
citizenship should be seen in a wider context and not primarily linked with the 
executive’s capacity to fight security threats epitomized by Muslim terrorism, 
despite official discourses to this extent. There is an increasingly strong nexus 
developing between nationality, immigration and security in which all three 
components are equally important in understanding the larger processes at 
work. 
The UK example shows that the rules on loss of citizenship are important in un-
derstanding the relationship between citizen and the state since they also ex-
press ideals of membership and identity. Citizenship deprivation powers can 
be seen as acts of sovereignty but also as ‘technologies of citizenship’ that ex-
plain how citizenship is made and unmade.92 It is worth underlying that citizen-
ship even when discussed as a legal status, is not a given; it is born out of con-
testation and a process of claim-making. The legal rules applicable to citizen-
ship acquisition and loss are designed to operate as inclusinary/exclusionary 
practices that define the citizenry within a political unit. It is in this sense, that 
they help make and un-make citizenship by reinforcing the rules of membership 
and above all by trying to fix the coordinates of national identity. A large part 
of citizenship literature has been preoccupied with the demise of the nation 
state and its underlying ideology of sovereignty. Processes as varied as globa-
lization, the rise of the human rights regimes, migration or global economic 
flows were seen as challenging the capacity of the state to deliver its side of 
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the social contract. As Nyers reminds us ‘the provision of safety, security and 
protection is key to the perceived legitimacy of any state’.93 It is also important to 
note that these values are primarily designed to be enjoyed by citizens within 
the cocooned space of the national state, which helps explain the desirability 
of citizenship as a legal status since it embodies our ‘dreams and aspirations of 
the good life’.94 Claims that we are moving beyond the citizenship-versus- 
statelessness model since ‘the difference between having and not having citizen-
ship is becoming blurred as the territorialisation of entitlements is increasingly 
challenged by deterritorialised claims beyond the state’95 proclaim the end of 
state monopoly over the delivery of the ‘good life’. Human rights and, in the EU 
context, the development of supranational EU citizenship rights and rights for 
certain categories of TCNs were seen as the main challenges to the existing 
design of membership. 
The case of citizenship deprivation powers fits well with those theories suggest-
ing that national citizenship is not irrelevant but that it is itself being altered in 
order to meet the challenges posed by globalization and migration.96 Writing 
in the context of Europe, Kofman has noted that in some ways the relationship 
between citizenship and nationality seems to be weakening, especially when it 
comes to the disconnection between the delivery of EU rights and nationality 
while at the same time it is being recast in other areas. As such, while the state 
is the object upon which globalization and human rights act, it is also clearly a 
subject that re- acts to these processes.97 Her analysis points in the direction of 
the state’s capacity to reassert its sovereignty within these new geometries of 
power ‘by demanding the affirmation of belonging and loyalty, leading to 
greater emphasis on obligations in the practice of citizenship’.98 Although we are 
accustomed to think of state sovereignty as the founding legal principle of the 
international order and the power of the state to govern internally, it should be 
equally underlined that sovereignty is a practice and as such it can be de-
scribed as ‘historical, performative, constantly in motion’.99 In the field of citizen-
ship, the need to constantly reassert sovereignty is captured by the design of 
safe and loyal citizens. This project is legal, in the sense that it depends upon 
                                         
93 Nyers (2010) p. 51. 
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96 K. Nash (2009) Between Citizenship and Human Rights, Sociology 43, pp. 1067-1083. 
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legal rules of citizenship attribution, as well as political since it puts forward a 
model of worthy citizens: new citizens among others have to be economically 
self-sufficient, have a high moral standing, be culturally integrated, and above 
all conform to state defined values and objectives. 
 
